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"Sound economic management includes maintaining an appropriately valued 
currency. It has long been recognized that 'getting the exchange rate right' IS 
essential for achieving macroeconomic stability on a sustained basis"! 
It is exactly because of the importance of a country's exchange rate in its macroeconomic 
stability that exchange rate regimes have been the focus of much research and debate. 
After the demise of the Bretton Woods system of exchange rate arrangements in the early 
1970s, many different countries have adopted exchange rate regimes with varying degrees of 
flexibility. Globalization and international trade have increased countries' reliance on 
international trade and some countries have had to change their exchange rate regimes many 
times in order to achieve stability in response to shocks. 
While some countries have managed to maintain some consistency in their choice of an 
exchange rate regime, others have had to make major changes, sometimes during financial crisis. 
Although countries differ in their internal financial conditions and macroeconomic fundamentals, 
many seem to have adopted the same regime choice, while some countries that seem to share 
many similarities have adopted very different regimes. Countries with different regime choices 
have had varying degrees of economic growth and development, but there has yet to be a 
consensus on whether their choice of regime had contributed to their economic success, or instead 
had impeded their growth, or even not have contributed anything at all. 
The main focus of this paper is to answer the question of whether the exchange rate 
regime adopted by a country affects its economic growth (the measurement of output growth used 
is real per capita GDP growth) and inflation. There has been previous work done which looked at 
the same question; however, different authors have drawn different conclusions. As Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2002) point out, previous studies trying to relate exchange rate regimes to 
macroeconomic performance have only had relatively weak empirical findings. They attribute 
I IMF, "Exchange Rate Arrangements and Economic Perfonnance in Developing Countries." 1997. 
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this to the possibility that the IMF's de jure classification, based on what regime countries claim 
to be running, that was used by those studies might have significant misclassifications. This paper 
will address the difference in classification regimes by comparing the studies done by two 
different sets of authors, each using completely different regime classification methods. 
If regime classifications do seem to matter for explaining output growth or inflation, then 
it would be interesting to find out what intrinsic information contained in exchange rate regimes 
could possible be used to explain output growth or inflation, or both. More importantly, could 
either volatility in nominal exchange rates or volatility in reserves be used in place of different 
regimes as an explanatory variable for economic growth? 
To understand the ongoing debate for and against certain exchange rate regimes, let us 
first look at the pros and cons of a more flexible regime versus that of a fixed regime. 
Pros and Cons of a Fixed Regime: 
When a country pegs its currency to another country's currency, it effectively subjects 
itself to the foreign country's monetary policy. Assuming that the foreign country is conducting 
sound monetary policy, then this would be a good way for the country to benefit from the foreign 
country's monetary management. Countries that are experiencing problems such as hyper 
inflation might choose to do this as this would show a country's level of commitment to monetary 
policy and provide credibility.2 This is useful for a country to gain the confidence of investors and 
the public. 
Countries that have similar economic structures and experience the same exogenous 
shocks would find a fixed common currency for all of them beneficial as the equilibrium real 
exchange rate between the two currencies will seld.om change much.3 Having a common currency 
will then decrease the transaction costs of trade between the countries. Countries that are more 
likely to benefit from a fixed regime would also include those that have less diversified 
2 Mills & Wood (1993) and Stockman (1999) provide some brief examples. 
3 Stockman (1999) mentions this in his discussion about the possible benefits of a fixed regime. 
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-
production and exports, are more geographically concentrated in terms of their trade partners and 
have a higher degree of factor mobility.4 Relatively small countries that trade mainly with a few 
countries would find it beneficial to peg their currency to their main trading partner's to make 
trade easier and less costly in term~ of decreasing the unpredictability of exchange rates. One 
example would be the European Exchange-rate System (ERM), where fixing to one common 
currency would allow member countries to reap the benefits of free movement of goods, labor 
and capital within Europe. 
Fixed regimes have been argued to lead to lower nominal exchange rate volatility, lower 
inflation and also lower volatility in inflation rates.5 Since exchange rates are fixed presumably to 
a more stable currency belonging to a country with better monetary management, we would 
expect that this would increase stability and credibility. Since volatility might increase risk and 
decrease trade and investment, having this lower volatility should lead to higher growth and 
lower inflation. 
The negative effects of having a fixed exchange rate regime are those that are caused by a 
lack of flexibility of monetary policy. Countries that fix their exchange rates in effect also fix 
their monetary policy to that of the foreign country's since they would no longer be able to 
control their own currency's fluctuations in the markets. This also prevents them from using 
monetary policy for meeting other objectives when necessary, such as to adjust their currency 
exchange rates when hit by shocks. Such fixed regimes might cause misalignments in the value of 
their currency with other currencies, for example artificially maintaining a currency at a higher 
value, which would hurt exports. Lack of exchange rate adjustments and the uncertainty about the 
sustainability of a peg will result in distortion of prices and misallocation of resources if faced 
with real shocks.6 
4 IMF's discussion gives a list of criteria of countries that might benefit from fixed regimes. 
5 See Flood & Rose (1999), Edwards & Savastano(1999), Ghosh et. al.(l997) for examples. 
6 Stockman (1999) and Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2000c). 
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Pros and Cons of a Flexible Regime: 
It seems that flexible regimes are exactly the opposite of fixed regimes in terms of its 
benefits and disadvantages. Countries that choose a flexible regime will not be showing their 
credibility in terms of commitment to a certain monetary policy, but would benefit instead from 
the freedom to use their own monetary policy tools. Since a country is no longer fixing its 
monetary policy to another country's, this allows the country the flexibility to independently 
decide on responses to domestic and foreign shocks.7 Stockman points out that nominal exchange 
rates that can adjust accordingly to shocks may allow the real exchange rate to adjust since 
nominal prices are sticky in the short run. Flexibility might be able to "cushion" the effects ofthe 
short-run changes in price-levels, thereby allowing other things like unemployment to adjust 
without too much volatility. 
This flexibility allows a country to respond better to exogenous shocks and avoids the 
misalignment problems created by a fixed regime. The currency will be able to adjust to an 
appropriate level dictated by the forces of supply and demand in the markets. 
The disadvantage of a flexible regime is that it might create more volatility and 
uncertainty and thus increase the transaction costs on international markets. Mills and Wood point 
out that the possibility of exchange rate change might deter some traders and investors, and this 
will hamper international trade. Flexibility being the opposite of a fixed regime, will no longer 
give a country the credibility of sticking to a certain monetary policy, and this tends to be 
associated with higher inflation rates.8 This might not be true for countries with well-managed 
economies and sound monetary policy, but then, such countries' economic growth would not be 
greatly affected by their exchange rate regimes. 
There is still a lot of debate going on about which type of regime is better or even how 
certain types of regimes would affect a country's macroeconomic performance. There are also 
7 Edwards (99). 
8 See footnote 2. 
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papers written (from both theoretical and empirical perspectives) that find that exchange rate 
regimes do not matter much if at all in terms of a country's growth, inflation rates and volatility.9 
The next section discusses the issues involved in classifying exchange rate regimes. 
Section 3 will give an overview of previous work done by two sets of authors who used either a 
de facto or de jure classification and the different results they obtained. Section 4 will present an 
attempt to fmd out why the results differ, the data used and regressions that I ran to compare the 
results. Section 5 to 7 will present the results I obtained for my regressions on growth and 
inflation respectively. Section 8 to 10 will present regressions and their results that use the 
volatility of nominal exchange rates and volatility of reserves as explanatory variables. The final 
section will be my conclusions. 
2. Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes: 
One of the problems with trying to determine empirically exchange rate regimes' effects 
is how to classify a country's exchange rate regime. There are de jure classifications of regimes, 
which are based on what a country's central bank declares their exchange rate commitment to be. 
Merely declaring a certain exchange rate arrangement is no guarantee that that will be the regime 
adhered to by the country's monetary authorities. Some countries have declared one regime but in 
actuality are conducting a different type of regime. There are countries that had declared a peg 
but devalued their currency so often that essentially they were closer to running an intermediate 
regime. For example, previous work by Klein and Marion (1997) have concluded that since the 
1950s, Latin American countries with pegged currencies have had an average duration of the 
fixed rates of only 32 months. There have also been countries that declared a float or some 
intermediate regime but in effect intervened in the exchange markets so often their currencies 
were in effect held quite stable. One example would be the Philippines before the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. 
9 For examples, Mills & Wood (1993) and Flood & Rose (1993). 
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Another way of classifying regimes is based on what countries appear to do, which might 
give a better indication of the effects of certain regimes on economic performance. For example, 
some indicators of a fIxed exchange rate would include having a stable nominal exchange rate; 
stable reserves would be one indicator of a flexible regime. However, Ghosh et. al. points out that 
this de facto classifIcation does not allow one to determine whether the stable nominal exchange 
rates observed are the result of an absence of shocks or the result of policy actions that managed 
to offset the shocks. 
When looking empirically at the economic performance of countries in relation to their 
regime choice, differences in results that could arise due to different classifIcation methods have 
to be taken into account. A comparison between results obtained from regressions using both 
classifIcation methods would yield insights into this difference. Since both regime classifIcations 
are not without their faults, Ghosh et. al. have attempted to account for the de facto behavior by 
running robustness tests. We shall look at their results in the next section. 
3. Overview of Previous Papers: 
In their 1997 paper "Does the Nominal Exchange Rate Matter?" Ghosh, Ostry, GuIde and 
Wolf looked at whether different exchange rate regimes matter for per capita output growth of a 
country, volatility of growth rates, average inflation rates, as well as the volatility of inflation. 
The authors ran regressions with these macroeconomic variables as dependent variables and 
included regime choice as one of the possible explanatory variables. They also performed 
robustness checks that tried to take out possible reverse causality, spillover effects of regimes and 
other potential biases. 
The data used were annual observations for one hundred and thirty-six countries for the 
period from 1960 to 1990. Ghosh et. al. classifIed regimes using the IMF's Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, which is a de jure classifIcation. Taking into 
account the fact that using just a de jure classifIcation is not a satisfactory method to classify 
regimes, they conducted robustness tests that used a secondary classifIcation where pegs and 
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intermediate regimes were divided into "frequent" and "infrequent" adjusters. Countries officially 
following a pegged regime were classified as frequent adjusters in those years in which more than 
one adjustment was made of either the weights or par values. 
Their initial regressions divided up regimes into three main categories of pegged, 
intermediate and floating exchange rate regimes. The pegged regimes were the single currency 
pegs, SDR pegs and other published basket pegs and secret basket pegs. Intermediates were those 
with cooperative systems, unclassified floats and target zones. The float group was made up of 
floats without predetermined ranges and free floats. In their robustness checks, they used a finer 
nine-way classification of regimes, but found that the results were the same if they had 
aggregated those nine classifications into just three categories (fixed, intermediate and flexible). 
The authors came to the conclusion that the exchange rate regime did matter for 
macroeconomic performancelO • In particular they found that countries with pegged regimes had 
significantly lower and less variable inflation rates. Their robustness checks that split countries 
into "frequent" and "infrequent" adjusters found that "frequent" adjusters had higher inflation 
than "infrequent" adjusters, although both groups still had lower inflation than floats. Per capita 
output growth rates however, differed insignificantly across different regimes, with only slightly 
lower growth under pegged rates. Volatility of output growth was less under floating rates. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger's (2001) paper "To Float or to Trail: Evidence on the 
Impact qf Exchange Rate Regimes" used a sample of 154 countries to compare their economic 
growth from 1974 to 1999. This paper focused on output growth while another paper by the same 
authors "Exchange Rate Regimes and Economic Performance" (2000) looked at inflation and 
interest rates using the same set of data. The authors chose to exclude the Bretton Woods period 
IO The authors also divided up their observations using such criteria as low growth and high growth 
samples, etc, and ran regressions on those as part of robustness checks. Their general results did not 
change. Please see the paper for more detailed discussions. 
8 
in their data set as fixed exchange rate regimes were dominant in this period due largely to 
political rather than economic reasons, which might bias results. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (from here on referred to as LYS) classified regimes using 
a de facto method that looks at actual exchange rate and reserve volatility of countries rather than 
what their central bank had declared their regime commitment to be. To construct their regime 
classification, they used K-means cluster analysis methodology, and sorted the regimes into five 
groups: fixed, crawling peg, dirty float, flexible and inconc1usives 11. In sorting the regimes, they 
looked at three criteria: 
1) Exchange rate volatility: measured as the average of the absolute monthly percentage changes 
in the nominal exchange rate during a calendar year. 
Since they chose the calendar year as their unit of account, in years where the exchange rate 
regime changes, the classification for that year would reflect a combination of both regimes. One 
example they gave was for Argentina, which implemented a fixed exchange rate in April of 1991. 
Since there were strong movements in the nominal exchange rate during the first three months of 
the year, the country is classified as a dirty float for 1991. This is in contrast with the IMP de jure 
classification which Ghosh et. aI. used, which is based on the officially declared regime as of the 
end of each year. 
2) Volatility of exchange rate changes: measured as the standard deviation of the monthly 
percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate. 
3) Volatility of reserves measured as the average of the absolute monthly change in the 
international reserves measured in dollars, relative to the monetary base in the previous month 
(also in dollars). 
\1 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger's regime classification method is explained in their paper "Classifying 
Exchange Rate Regimes: Deeds vs. Words". This regime classification dataset is available on their website 
http://www . utdt.edu/-ely or http://www . utdt.edul-fsturzen 
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Net reserves is measured as (Foreign Assets - Foreign Liabilities - Central Government Deposits) 
divided by the price ofa dollar in terms of local currency. This measurement tries to approximate 
as closely as possible the change in reserves due to intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
To compute (1) and (2), Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger had to find a suitable currency of 
reference. For fixed regimes, the currency of reference used was the legal peg currency. For 
others, the currency was compared with the US Dollar, French franc, German marc, British 
pound, SDR, ECU and the Japanese Yen. The currency that a country's exchange rate exhibited 
the lowest volatility against was picked as the reference currency. For countries such as the 
United States, United Kingdom, etc, the same comparisons were carried out against the same set 
of currencies (excluding own currency) and the currency that yielded the lowest volatility when 
measured against was used. Countries that pegged to a basket were not included in the sample 
unless their central peg parity or basket weights were known. 
In classifying regimes, the authors used the following criteria: countries which had high 
volatility of exchange rates but low volatility in reserves were classified as flexible regimes. 
Fixed regimes were those that had high reserve volatility and low nominal exchange rate 
volatility. Crawling pegs had volatile nominal exchange rates that moved in stable increments 
(low volatility exchange rate changes), and volatile reserves. Dirty floats would have high 
volatility in all criteria. The inconclusive group was countries that had low volatility in all the 
criteria, and thus did not correspond to any particular defmition of regimes. 
T,he de facto regime classification was constructed using a two-round procedure, where 
the cluster analysis was applied to all the observations in the first round and classifications were 
assigned to all possible observations, leaving only "inconclusives". This group of "inconclusives" 
was then reclassified using the same methodology as the first round 12. In order to provide as 
12 In this way, the authors make a distinction between "high variability" (classified in first round) and "low 
variability" (classified in second round) observations, which provides additional refmement to the 
classification. 
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comprehensive a classification as possible, the authors used additional information other than the 
three criteria mentioned above to classify countries that were not assigned a regime through the 
two-round procedure13. 
In running my regressions, I used the de facto classification provided by LYS. I did not 
divide up the observations into first and second rounds however, and used an index which 
combined first and second round observations. Furthermore, I combined the crawling peg and 
dirty float observations into an intermediate group in order to maintain consistency in 
comparisons with the de jure classification. 
Some observations classified as "inconclusive" under the de facto classification were 
included in my regressions in order to match the same observations included in the regressions 
which used the de jure classification. These "inconclusives" would have been grouped with the 
flexible regimes in those regressions since the dummy variable used captured only intermediate 
and fixed regimes. As a check that these "inconclusives" would not affect my results 
significantly, a dummy variable was later included for "inconclusives" and the regressions were 
rerun. The "inconclusive" dummy variable was insignificant. 
In one of their robustness checks, L YS classified the "inconclusives" as "high credibility" 
fixes and added them to the sample for regressions. They reported results that remained 
unchanged. They concluded that the distinction between high and low credibility fixes were 
insignificant. This is consistent with my finding that this group "inconclusives" would not bias 
results. 
The main conclusions that L YS found for output growth was that less flexible regimes 
were strongly associated with slower growth and greater output volatility14. As for inflation, fixed 
13 Countries that could not be classified included those that no information on reserves were available or the 
"inconclusives" from the second round classification. The authors provide detailed information on how this 
classification is done in their paper. 
14 The authors also ran robustness checks and further divided up the classification to look at industrial 




exchange rate regimes did not seem to have any significant effects on the inflation level when 
compared with pure floats, but intermediate regimes fared the worst in terms of higher inflation 
rates. 
In their robustness checks, a few interesting results are observed. One is that Ghosh et. al 
split their sample into high-income countries and low-income countries, and found that high-
income countries had lower average inflation rates under all three regimes. For low-income 
countries, intermediate regimes had the worst inflation. This result is similar to L YS splitting 
their sample into industrial and non-industrial samples and finding that intermediate regimes 
fared the worst. Another interesting result is that overall, the lowest inflation is observed not for 
single currency pegs, but for countries on a cooperative system, including the European Monetary 
System (EMS). Cooperative systems are classified as intermediates under the de jure 
classification, and Ghosh et. al. do find that intermediate regimes have lower inflation compared 
to floats. 
Differences between the papers: 
The two papers have very different conclusions regarding growth and inflation, which 
might be caused by a variety of reasons. 
One obvious difference between the two papers is their classification of regimes. Ghosh 
et. al. used a de jure classification, but conduct robustness checks by looking at frequent and 
infrequent adjusters of pegs. They fmd that frequent adjusters have higher inflation rates 
compared to infrequent adjusters, but those rates were still lower than free floaters. In 
comparison, L YS found intermediate regimes to have the highest inflation rates. 
L YS used a completely de facto classification of regimes, but as a benchmark 
comparison, do the same regressions using the IMF de jure classification. In their growth results, 
they find that using the IMF classification, intermediate regimes grow significantly faster, but 
there is no difference between floats and pegs. This result is almost comparable to Ghosh et. al.'s 
results, except that Ghosh et. al.'s regression results do not find intermediate regimes to be 
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significantly better performers (they did perform better, but not significantly) but LYS's results 
do. Using the de facto classification, flexible regimes were found to be the best performers in 
terms of growth, not intermediate regimes. 
Another difference between the papers is the time period from which the data was drawn. 
The countries used might also have differed significantly. From the results of splitting the 
samples conducted by both sets of authors, we can see that the results are sensitive to the 
countries in the sample as well as the time period of the observations. L YS do point out in their 
paper that the difference between their results for inflation and Ghosh et. al.'s "may be attributed 
to the fact that their (Ghosh's) sample, which covers the period 1960-1990, may be reflecting the 
coincidence of low inflation and a predominance of pegs during the Bretton Woods period ... ". 
The right hand side variables used in regressions for both papers share many ~imilar 
variables, but also differ in a few places. For the regressions on inflation, both Ghosh et. al. and 
LYS used growth rates of broad money (6. M2), growth of interest rates (6. int), a measure of 
openness «exports plus imports) divided by GDP), and output growth (6. y) in their regressions. 
Ghosh also has turnover rates of the central bank governor (Tum) as an explanatory variable, 
while LYS have inflation lagged one period (inf(-I)) as an explanatory variable that Ghosh does 
not. 
For their output growth regressions, the similar explanatory variables are investment over 
GDP ratio (I/Y), growth in government consumption lagged one period (6. gov(-I)) and 
variability of terms of trade (0- tt). LYS have five additional variables: population growth (6.pop), 
initial per capita GDP (GDP70, averaged over the period 1970-73), secondary enrollment (sec), 
index of civil liberties (civil) and openness. Ghosh has an index of development (devind) and 
growth rates of external trade (6. ext) as explanatory variables that L YS do not. These differences 
in variables used might also be a cause of the differences in results obtained by both sets of 
authors. 
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4. Data and Regressions: 
It is difficult to determine the source of the drastically different results obtained by both 
sets of authors. In order to form a better understanding of the results, the same methodologies 
need to be applied to the same data. I used the classification methods of both and also the 
variables of their r~gressions to obtain results that can then be compared. Appendix I lists the 
explanatory variables I used and their sources. I used data from the same sources as the authors as 
much as possible, using close substitutes from different sources when unable to find the same 
exact data . 
. Data for GDP growth, money growth, inflation, investment to GDP ratio and other 
variables were obtained from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. A de jure regime 
classification was put together based on the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions. The data used was from 1974 to 1999, observations for the same 
countries were used. For the de facto classification, LYS's regime classification was obtained 
from their website. This way, comparisons can be made for the same observations within the 
same period of time. 
With the de jure classification, the regression for inflation rate was run using Ghosh's variables: 
Where inflation rate is regressed on dummy variables for fixed and intermediate regimes (jix and 
inter respectively), output growth, turnover rates of the central bank governor, openness, growth 
of interest rates and growth rates of broad money. In Ghosh et. aJ.'s paper, they used turnover 
rates based on a set of proxies for central bank independence developed by Cukierman15 • For my 
15 See Cukierman, Alex (1992) Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
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regressions, I used turnover rates from de Haan, which should be comparable to those of 
Cukierman's 16. 
Using the same regime classification, I will regress inflation rate against the variables that 
L YS had used for their explanatory variables: 
Where inflation rate is regressed on dummies for fixed and intermediate regimes, output growth, 
openness, growth of interest rates, growth rates of broad money and inflation lagged one period. 
The regressions for output growth were run using the explanatory variables used by 
Ghosh et. al.: 
..1y = a + /31 (flX}il + /32 (inter}iI + /33 (mt}il + /34 (..1gov(-l}}il + /35 (devind}il + /36 (l/Y)iI +/37 (..1ext}i/ 
(3) 
Where real per capita GDP growth is regressed on dummies for fixed and intermediate regimes, 
variability of terms of trade, lagged growth in government consumption, index of development, 
investment over GDP ratio and growth of external trade. 
Output growth is then regressed against the explanatory variables used by LYS: 
..1 y = a + /31 (flX}iI + /32 (inter}iI + /33 (ml}iI + /34 (L1gov(-l}}iI + /35 (IIY)iI + /36 (PopJu + /37 
(GDP70}iI + + /38 (Sec}iI + /39 (Civil}iI + /310 (Open}iI (4) 
Where output growth is regressed on the dummies for de jure fixed and intermediate regimes, 
variability of terms of trade, lagged growth in government consumption, investment over GDP 
ratio, population growth, initial per capita GDP, secondary enrollment, civil liberties and 
openness. L YS used "total gross enrollment rate for secondary education" for their secondary 
enrollment variable!? I used " 'secondary school attained' in total population (above 25 years 
old) for my sec variable. 
16 de Haan and Kooi (2000) states that the correlation between their turnover indicators and Cukierman's 
are quite high. 
17 Based on Barro, Robert (1991) Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries Quarterly Journal 
o/Economics May, pp. 407-443 
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The same four regressions above were then rerun using the de facto classification instead of the 
de jure classification. The results can be compared to see whether classification of regime 
mattered for determining effects of regimes on inflation and output growth. 
A third set of regressions was run, combining the explanatory variables from both sets of 
authors' regressions, both the de jure and de facto classifications were used in turn. This allowed 
comparisons to see whether different variables were the cause of the differences in results 
obtained. 
First Look at the Data: 
Comparing the de jure classification with the de facto classification, out of 2775 
observations, 1625 observations were classified differently under both regimes (this includes 
observations classified as "inconclusives" under the de facto classification). The mismatch rate of 
the two regime classifications is very high. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the different regimes 
under both classifications. Although the ratios of the three regimes are quite similar, the countries 
contained within those groups are very different. 
Table 2 shows the average rates of inflation and output-growth for the entire sample of 
2690 observations. The average inflation rate for the entire sample is 21 %, and the average output 
growth is 1. 7%. 
Table 3 compares the average inflation rates and average output growth for the fixed, 
intermediate and flexible regime samples under both regime classifications. For the de jure 
classification, the intermediate regime sample had the highest average output growth rate at 2.2%, 
with fixed regimes having the lowest average output growth at 1.5%. Flexible regimes had the 
highest average inflation rate (45%) for the de jure classification, with fixed regimes having the 
lowest (12%). For the de facto classification regime, flexible regimes had the highest average 
output growth rate at 2.1 %, while intermediates had the lowest at 1.4%. For inflation rates, 
intermediates had the highest inflation rates at 56%, while fixes had the lowest at 10%. 
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Although the first look at the data shows different results for both regime classifications, 
however the standard deviations of those averages were relatively large, and defmite conclusions 
cannot be drawn. Thus a more formal regression analysis would be better to compare the 
differences. 
5. Output Growth Results: 
Table 4 gives the regressions results for output growth. 
For the regression run using LYS's variables, and either the de facto or de jure regime 
classification, the same variables were statistically significant. Investment over GDP ratio (flY) 
and openness (open) were positive and significant, while population growth (l1pop) and initial per 
capita GDP (GDP70) were all negative and significant. Comparing the results I obtained with 
L YS' s results from their paper, coefficients for two variables were different: civil wasn't 
significant in my regressions while L YS found it to be significant. L YS found open to be negative 
but insignificant. This difference in results could be due to different data used for the variables, 
especially secondary attainment. The data for secondary attainment was not available for all 
countries, and this greatly restricted my observations to only 816. Due to this difference, L YS' s 
regressions could have used a sample of countries that were different from mine. Inflation rate 
was included in this regression just to see whether output growth is significantly explained by 
inflation rates. Inflation rates turned out to be insignificant for explaining output growth. 
Both the coefficients for the fixed and intermediate regimes were not significant 
regardless of the regime classification used: output growth rates for fixed and intermediate 
regimes were comparable to those of floats, and thus exchange rate regimes do not appear to 
matter for output growth. This result is completely different from what Levy-Y eyati and 
Sturzenegger found. 
Regressions using both regime classifications but Ghosh et. al.'s variables confirmed that 
exchange rate regimes do not matter for output growth. Ghosh et. al. found the coefficients for the 
development index (devind), investment over GDP ratio (ur), growth rates of external trade 
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(Aext) and variability ofterms of trade (utt) significant. My regression results were similar, except 
that my coefficient for the variability of terms of trade was not significant. Both the coefficients 
for the fixed and intermediate regime dummies in my regressions were insignificant. This result is 
consistent with what Ghosh et. al. found from their regressions. 
6. Inflation Results: 
Table 5 gives the regressions results for inflation. 
Turnover rates of central bank governor was not available for all countries, thus in order 
to keep the sample of countries in the regressions constant, observations for which turnover data 
was not available were excluded from the sample for all four regressions. 
For the regressions ran using LYS's independent variables, when the de facto 
classification was used, the coefficient for the intermediate regime dummy was positive and 
significant at the 5% level. All else equal, intermediate regimes tend to have 16% higher inflation 
than flexible regimes. There is no difference between the inflation performance of fixed and 
flexible regimes. 
When the de jure classificatiorrwas used, both the coefficients for fixed and-intermediate 
regime dummies were negative and significant. The coefficients were almost equal in magnitude; 
fixed and intermediate regimes tend to have about 19% lower inflation than flexible regimes. 
With Ghosh et. al.'s set of independent variables, the above results were also obtained 
when regressions using both regime classifications were run. For the de facto classification, 
intermediate regimes had 22% higher inflation than floats, while the coefficient for fixed regimes 
was insignificant. For the de jure classification, fixed regimes and intermediate regimes tended to 
have 20% and 26% less inflation than floats respectively. 
From the results we obtained, we see that using either L YS' s or Ghosh et. al.' s variables, 
the same conclusions for the regime variables were obtained. However, going from one regime 
classification to the other, we obtain different results. An inspection of the observations used in 
the regressions reveals that there are a substantial number of mismatched regime classifications. 
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Appendix 2 gives a list of country observations that differ in the two regime classifications. Note 
that most of the countries with mismatches were developing countries. 
One reason why the results showed that de jure intermediates and de jure fixes had 
substantially lower inflation rates than floats could be due to the fact that many countries that 
declared their regime to be intermediates were actually de facto floats (100 mismatched 
observations), and countries that declared their regimes to be fixed, were de facto intermediate 
and flexible (71 and 74 observations respectively). A large number of de jure fixed were de facto 
"inconclusives" (137 observations), and if we look at these "inconclusives" as a "high credibility" 
sample, they have on average lower inflation rates. The 617 "inconclusives" in the de facto 
classification have an average inflation rate of 9%, whereas average inflation rates for the fixed, 
intermediate and flexible were all double-digit numbers in this time period. Thus this would cause 
the coefficient on the fixed regime dummy for the de jure regression to show a significant 
negative sign. 
From the results for inflation, we can see that the variables used by both sets of authors 
are not the cause of the difference in their results, but rather their regime classification methods. 
Since both sets of regressions give us different results, a definite conclusion about the effect of 
exchange rate regimes on inflation rate of countries is hard to determine. 
7. Results for Combining Both Sets of Authors' Variables: 
As another check as to whether the variables used by both sets of authors were affecting 
the result~ they obtained, I ran a third set of regressions using both regime classifications but 
combining the independent variables used by both sets of authors. Table 6 gives the regression 
results. 
The results for the growth regressions are the same: regime differences do not explain 
differences in output growth rates. The results for inflation do not change either except for the 
values ofthe coefficients. For the de jure classification regression, intermediates have 23% lower 
inflation than floats, while fixed have 18% lower inflation than floats, when before both 
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coefficients were equal. Generally, we still see that it is the regime classification that changes our 
results, not the sample used and not the independent variable set. 
8. Regressions Using Volatilitv As Explanatory Variables: 
We know that different exchange rate regime classifications will yield different results 
for regressions on inflation. I ran regressions using exchange rate volatility (aExrate) and reserves 
volatility (aReserves) as explanatory variables, since these two measures were used to group 
countries into certain exchange rate regime categories based on how much volatility countries 
displayed in these two variables. Perhaps instead of grouping countries into only three categories 
of fixed, intermediate or flexible, a measure of the volatility in these two variables would be 
enough to explain output growth or inflation. 
Using data from the IFS, the nominal exchange rate volatility was calculated as the 
average of the absolute value of the monthly change in the nominal exchange rate. Reserves 
volatility was calculated in the same way using total reserves from the IFS. 
The regressions for growth were: 
Using L YS' s independent variables: 
Lly = a + /31 (aExrate)u + /32 (aReserves)it + /33 (att)it + /34 (LlgoV(-l))it + /35 (I/YJit + /36 (Pop)it + 
/3dGDP70)it + + /38 (Sec)it + /39 (Civil)it + /310 (Open)u (5) 
Using Ghosh et. al.'s independent variables: 
.,1 y = a + /31 (aExrate)it + /32 (aReserves)/t + /33 (att)i/ + /34 (Llgov(-l))i/ + /35 (devind)jt + /36 (IIYJit 
+/3dLlext}iI (6) 
The regressions for inflation were: 
Using LYS's independent variables: 
In/ = a + /3laExrate)it + /32(aReserves)it + /33(.,1 y)it + /34(open)it + /35(Mnt)it + /36(.,1 M2 )it 
+/3lin/(-l));t (7) 
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Using Ghosh et. al.'s independent variables: 
In! = a + Pl(JExrate)it + P2(uReserves)tt + P3(L1 Y)it + P4(Turn)it + P5(Open)it + P6(L1int)it + 
(8) 
The regressions were the same as before except that the regime dummies were replaced by the 
volatility variables. 
9. Results for Regressions Using Volatility: 
Table 7 gives the results obtained when output growth was regressed on the volatility 
variables and the independent variables of LYS and also those of Ghosh et.al. Using LYS's 
variables, both the coefficients of nominal exchange rate volatility and reserves volatility were 
found to be negative and significant. Higher volatility in nominal exchange rate and high 
volatility in reserves would decrease output growth. 
Looking at the regression results using Ghosh et.al. 's variables, we see that the 
coefficient on reserves volatility was also negative and significant; however, nominal exchange 
rate volatility's coefficient was insignificant. The regression ran combining the independent 
variables of both L YS and Ghosh et.al showed the nominal exchange rate coefficient to be 
negative and with a lower probability value, but the coefficient was still not significant. 
This difference in results might be attributed to two particular independent variables that 
Ghosh et. al. had but L YS didn't: development index and growth of external trade. Perhaps there 
is some correlation between either of these variables with the volatility of nominal exchange rate 
that could have decreased the volatility'S significance in explaining output growth. To check this, 
I looked at the correlation matrix between nominal exchange rate and the growth regression 
variables. Table 8 shows the correlation matrix. Neither the development index variable nor the 
growth of external trade variable was highly correlated with the nominal exchange rate volatility. 
There might be some multicollinear relationship between nominal exchange rate and some of the 
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output growth variables that could have caused the difference in the results observed for the 
output growth regressions, and it is unclear as to which variables are the ones involved. 
Table 9 gives the regressions results for inflation. The inflation regression results showed 
that higher nominal exchange rate volatility would increase inflation rates. Reserves volatility 
was not significant in explaining inflation. Both the regressions using L YS and Ghosh et.a!.' s 
independent variables yielded the same results. 
10. Can Exchange Rate Volatility and Reserves Volatility Replace Regime Classifications as 
Explanatory Variables? 
Since it is the measures of nominal exchange rate volatility or reserves volatility that 
explains output growth and inflation, does it matter at all what exchange rate regime a country 
declares? Or do exchange rate regimes provide no effect on a country's economic performance? 
Table 10, 11 and 12 give the results for regressions ran using nominal exchange rate 
volatility, reserves volatility, and either de facto regime dummies or de jure regime dummies as 
explanatory variables. 
Looking at the results for inflation, nominal exchange rate volatility was significant in 
explaining inflation, but the coefficients for the regime dummies remained the same as in the 
regressions ran without nominal exchange rate volatility and reserves volatility as independent 
variables. For the regression with the de facto classification, the coefficient for intermediate 
regimes remained positive and significant. For the regression with the de jure classification, the 
coefficients for the fixed and intermediate regimes were still negative and significant. 
The results for the output growth regressions and the regressions combining both sets of 
authors' independent variables showed that the results obtained from earlier regressions (shown 
in Tables 4 and 6) do not change as a result of adding in nominal exchange rate volatility and 
reserves volatility as independent variables. 
Thus there is still some information contained in exchange rate regime classifications that 
explain inflation, other than volatility in nominal exchange rates and reserves. 
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11. Conclusions: 
Using a de jure exchange rate regime classification and a de facto classification, a 
comparison between the work done by two sets of authors on exchange rate regime and its effect 
on output growth and inflation was conducted. The results prove that the independent variables 
used were not the cause of the different conclusions the authors drew from their work, but instead 
it is the different exchange rate regime classifications used that were the source of the differences. 
The effect of exchange rate regime choice on output growth is insignificant regardless of the 
regime classification scheme. For inflation, the results obtained were different depending on the 
regime classification used. Using the de facto classification, intermediate regimes, which were 
countries that had high volatility in nominal exchange rates and also high volatility in reserves, 
had the highest inflation rate. No significant difference exists between fixed and flexible regimes. 
U sing the de jure classification, fixed and intermediate regimes had lower inflation rates 
compared to flexible regimes. Since such different results were obtained, a conclusion cannot be 
drawn about the effect of exchange rate regime on inflation based on the evidence we have. 
Regressions were also run using nominal exchange rate volatility and reserves volatility 
as independent variables. Increase volatility in nominal exchange rates will increase inflation. Its 
effect on output growth is ambiguous since regressions using either L YS' s or Ghosh et. al.' s set 
of independent variables led to different results. Reserves volatility has a negative effect on 
output growth, but no effect on inflation rates. 
Regressions using exchange rate volatility, reserves volatility as well as regime dummies 
showed that these two measures of volatility cannot fully account for the effect regimes have on 
inflation rates. Regimes contain other intrinsic information that can explain inflation rates other 
than the volatility of nominal exchange rates and volatility of reserves. 
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Appendix 1: 
Variables: Definitions and Sources: 
Civil Liberties (civil) Freedom House: Freedom in the World Country 
Ratings. 1 to 7 scale, 1 being the highest degree of 
freedom. 
Growth of interest rates (d int) IFS: Money market rates, ifnot available, discount 
rates, and then deposit rates. 
Growth of External Trade (d ext) IFS: Exports f.o.b. + imports c.i.f. 
Growth in Broad Money (d M2) IFS: Money + Quasi Money 
Index of Development (devind) World Development Indicators 2001: 
1 to 4 scale: 1 (low income countries), 2 (lower 
middle income), 3 (upper middle income) and 4 (high 
income) 
Inflation rate (inf) IFS: consumer prices. 
Inflation lagged one period (inf( -1» IFS: CPI % change over corresponding period 
Initial per capita GDP (GDP70) World Economic Outlook. Averaged over 1970-73. 
Investment over GDP (IN) IFS: Gross Fixed Capital Formation/GOP 
Lagged Growth in Government Consumption (dgov(-I» IFS: Government consumption 
Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility (O'Exrate) IFS: National Currency per SDR (period average) 
Calculated as the average of the absolute value of the 
monthly change of the nominal exchange rate. 
Openness (open) IFS: (exports + imports)/GDP 
Population growth (d pop) IFS: population 
Real per capita GOP growth (d y) IMF World Economic Outlook 
Reserves Volatility (O'Reserves) IFS: Total reserves (millions of SDR). 
Calculated as the average of the absolute value of the 
monthly change in the total reserves 
Secondary Attainment (sec) World bank website, Barro R. and J.W.Lee dataset. 
Variable used: percentage of "secondary school 
attained" in total population (above 25 years old). 
Turnover rates of central governor (turn) Obtained from Prof. Jakob de Haan, Tilburg 
University, the Netherlands 
Variability of terms of trade (0' ttl IFS: Unit Value Exports/Unit Value Imports. 
Variability calculated as a three year centered moving 
standard deviation of the terms of trade. 
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Appendix 2: Using LYS's variables, total number of observations in regression: 960 
Countries that were classified as de jure flexible: 
But were de facto intermediates (number of observations in brackets): 
Total: 80 
Argentina (2), Brazil (2), Colombia (1), Costa Rica (2), Dominican Republic (2), Ecuador 
(1), EI Salvador (2), Ethiopia (1), Gambia (2), Ghana (1), Guatemala (2), India (1), 
Indonesia (2), Jamaica (6), Korea (1), Kenya (1), Lebanon (7), Madagascar (1), Malawi 
(1), Mexico (4), Mozambique (2), Nigeria (7), Paraguay (5), Philippines (8), South Africa 
(4),Suriname (1), Tanzania (1), Trinidad and Tobago (3), Turkey (2), Uruguay (4), 
Zambia (1). 
But were de facto fixes: 
Total: 52 
Gambia (9), Ghana (5), Honduras (1), Jamaica (2), Kenya (1), Korea (1), Lebanon (5), 
Malawi (2), Mozambique (1), Nigeria (3), Philippines (7), Singapore (1), South Africa 
(4), Trinidad and Tobago (1), Uganda (6), Zambia (3). 
But were de facto inconc1usives: 
Total: 13 
Dominican Republic (1), EI Salvador (2), India (1), Mexico (3), Philippines (3), Trinidad 
and Tobago (3). 
Countries that were classified as de jure intermediates: 
But were de facto fixes: 
Total: 31 
Bahrain (1), Ghana (1), Honduras (2), Indonesia (8), Jamaica (3), Korea (3)~ Libya (2), 
Madagascar (1), Malaysia (1), Mexico (5), Nigeria (2), Pakistan (1), South Africa (1) 
But were de facto flexibles: 
Total: 100 
Chile (17), Colombia (9), Costa Rica (4), Cyprus (1), Dominican Republic (4), Ecuador 
(8), Greece (13), Guinea-Bissau (2), Honduras (2), India (12), Jamaica (1), Kenya (1), 
Malaysia (1), Mauritius (2), Mexico (1), Pakistan (5), Singapore (1), South Africa (2), Sri 
Lanka (6), Turkey (5), Uganda (1), Uruguay (2) 
But were de facto inconclusives: 
Total: 15 
Egypt (8), EI Salvador (3), India (1), Suriname (3) 
Countries that were classified as de jure fixed: 
But were de facto intermediates: 
Total: 71 
Chile (1), Cyprus (3), Ecuador (1), Egypt (1), Ethiopia (1), Ghana (4), Guatemala (1), 
Honduras (1), Indonesia (3), Jamaica (1), Jordan (6), Kenya (4), Korea (6), Malawi (1), 
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Malaysia (12), Mauritius (5), Morocco (2), Nepal (2), Paraguay (1), Seychelles (1), Sri 
Lanka (1), Suriname (1), Syrian Arab Republic (3), Tanzania (4), Venezuela (5) 
But were de facto flexibles: 
Tota1:74 
Burundi (9), Costa Rica (1), Cyprus (5), Ecuador (2), Ethiopia (2), Ghana (1), Greece (3), 
Guatemala (2), Indonesia (1), Jordan (10), Kenya (5), Korea (1), Malawi (1), Malaysia 
(5), Mauritius (2), Morocco (6), Nepal (4), Pakistan (1), Seychelles (1), Sri Lanka (3), 
Tanzania (3), Trinidad and Tobago (4), Turkey (1), Zambia (1) 
But were de facto inconclusives: 
Total: 137 
The Bahamas (1), Bahrain (4), Barbados (10), Belize (7), Burundi (2), Chile (1), Costa 
Rica (4), Ecuador (7), Egypt (12), El Salvador (5), Ethiopia (7), Ghana (7), Guatemala 
(6), Indonesia (3), Jordan (9), Korea (4), Nepal (5), Nigeria (1), Pakistan (5), Qatar (1), 
Saudi Arabia (1), Seychelles (2), Suriname (2), Syrian Arab Republic (18), Tanzania (2), 
Trinidad and Tobago (3), Venezuela (8) 
U sing Ghosh et. al.' s variables, number of observations in regression: 1004. 
959 of those observations were the same as those used in regressions using LYS's 
variables. Observations that were different and that had different classifications under de 
jure and de facto regimes were (number of observations in brackets): 
Countries that were classified as de jure flexible: 
But were de facto intermediates: 
Zambia 
But were de facto inconclusives: 
Lebanon (3) 
Countries that were classified as de jure fIXed: 
But were de facto intermediates: 
Bangladesh (2), Malawi (1), Uganda (1), Zambia (4) 
But were de facto flexibles: 
Bangladesh (1), Libya (3), Zambia (2) 
But were de facto inconclusives: 




"l"o ' \ \ ~I " 
Float 651 618 
Re ime 
Intermediate 590 624 
Fixed 913 1532 
Total 2154 (620 inconc1usiyes) 2774 
Table 2: 
INFLATIONRA TES GDPGROWTH 
Mean 0.206589 0.017266 
Median 0.083333 0.01532 
I 
Maximum 46.97436 1 
Minimum -0.5 -0.417385 
Std. Dey. 1.240927 0.074579 
Skewness 26.25187 2.994164 
Kurtosis 852.8208 36.84826 
Jarque-Bera 81255043 132433.7 
I Probability 0 0 
Sum 555.7251 46.44486 
Sum Sq. Dey. 4140.789 14.95612 





All Fixed: Intermediates: Flexible: 
observations: 
de de Facto de Jure de Facto de Jure de Facto 
Jure 
Mean 0.206589 
, 0.124166 0.107778 0.177012 0.561575 0.451792 0.162319 
Median 0.083333 
0.073533 0.073181 0.093747 0.125 0.101198 0.092045 
Maximum 46.97436 
9.676471 4.869996 4.832122 46.97436 46.97436 9.676471 
Minimum -0.5 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.178651 -0.178651 -0.136386 -0.165799 
Std. Dev. 1.240927 
0.368319 0.236518 0.352621 2.698321 2.558852 0.418027 
Real per capita GDP growth: 
All Fixed: Intermediates: Flexible: 
observations: 
de Jure de Facto de Jure de Facto de Jure de Facto 
Mean 0.017266 0.01519 0.01706 
7 9 0.022699 0.014368 0.017094 0.021048 
Median 0.01532 0.00815 0.01241 
9 4 0.022306 0.01759 0.019506 0.021949 
Maximum 1 0.67110 
1 6 0.485938 0.434003 0.683058 0.683058 
Minimum -0.417385 
-0.4 -0.30537 -0.191103 -0.417385 -0.417385 -0.367867 
Std. Dev. 0.074579 0.08495 0.07701 




Variables de Jure de Facto 
LYS Ghosh LYS Ghosh 
Constant: Coefficient estimate: 0.019602 -0.016801 0.018797 -0.018437 
Standard Error: 0.006712 0.006238 0.006395 0.005706 
p-value: 0.0036 0.0072 0.0034 0.0013 
I!Y Coefficient estimate: 0.084102 0.102658 0.081011 0.091625 
Standard Error: 0.018086 0.017067 0.017973 0.01689 
p-value: 0 0 0 0 
i\POP Coefficient estimate: -0.90437 -0.907227 
Standard Error: " 0.072383 0.072144 
p-value: 0 0 
GDP70 Coefficient estimate: -3.69E-06 -3.58E-06 
Standard Error: 1.21E-06 1.17E-06 
p-value: 0.0024 0.0024 
~Gov(-l) Coefficient estimate: -0.000728 -0.001189 -7.94E-04 -0.0011 
Standard Error: 0.001187 0.001262 1.19E-03 0.001265 
p-value: 0.5397 0.3467 0.503 0.3844 
Sec Coefficient estimate: -4.49E-05 -2.81E-05 
Standard Error: 0.000118 0.000113 
p-value: 0.7032 0.804 
Civil Coefficient estimate: -0.000121 -0.000161 
Standard Error: 0.001054 0.001042 
p-value: 0.9084 0.8773 
crtt Coefficient estimate: 0.001224 -0.000251 0.00128 -0.000412 
Standard Error: 0.001187 0.001149 0.001182 0.00114 
p-value: 0.3026 0.8271 0.2792 0.7178 
Devind Coefficient estimate: 0.002083 0.003195 
Standard Error: 0.001247 0.001093 
p-value: 0.0951 0.0036 
~ext Coefficient estimate: 0.078909 0.078304 
Standard Error: 0.007337 0.007344 
p-value: 0 0 
Open Coefficient estimate: 0.009353 0.009392 
Standard Error: 0.003288 0.003329 
p-value: 0.0046 0.0049 
Inf Coefficient estimate: -0.001273 -0.001342 -0.001344 -0.001476 
Standard Error: 0.001135 0.001197 0.001134 0.0012 
p-value: 0.2624 0.2623 0.2363 0.2192 
fix Coefficient estimate: -0.00195 -0.004221 -0.004527 -0.000262 
Standard Error: 0.003708 0.003644 0.00307 0.003041 
p-value: 0.5992 0.2471 0.1407 0.9313 
Intermedi Coefficient estimate: -0.002355 0.003481 0.00174 0.004975 
ate Standard Error: 0.003074 0.003088 0.003077 0.003142 
p-value: 0.4439 0.26 0.572 0.1137 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.191332 0.157483 0.1942 0.154864 
Durbin-Watson stat: 1.427231 1.862808 1.437149 1.847303 




(if turnover rates available) 
Variables de Jure de Facto 
LYS Ghosh LYS Ghosh 
Constant Coefficient estimate: 0.295046 0.113025 0.123497 -0.098574 
Standard Error: 0.044901 0.062173 0.035828 0.056228 
p-value: 0 0.0694 0.0006 0.0799 
Inf(-l) Coefficient estimate: 0.0016 0.001153 
Standard Error: 7.55E-05 7.59E-05 
l'-value: 0 0 
M12 Coefficient estimate: 0.026277 0.0449 0.022744 0.040031 
Standard Error: 0.007594 0.00805 0.007458 0.007912 
p-value: 0.0006 0 0.0024 0 
~int Coefficient estimate: 0.109524 0.13597 0.081353 0.116566 
Standard Error: 0.064058 0.068594 0.06449 0.069054 
J>-value: 0.1169 0.0477 0.2074 0.0917 
Open Coefficient estimate: 0.000198 0.021216 -0.000831 0.016141 
Standard Error: 0.026368 0.028492 0.026861 0.029044 
p-value: 0.994 0.4567 0.9753 0.5785 
~y Coefficient estimate: -0.482606 -0.636845 -0.510024 -0.679111 
Standard Error: 0.338514 0.358166 0.338375 0.357671 
p-value: 0.1543 0.0757 0.1321 0.0578 
Turn Coefficient estimate: 0.978599 0.915051 
Standard Error: 0.171581 0.170179 
p-value: 0 0 
Fix Coefficient estimate: -0.192696 -0.207944 -0.01746 0.044131 
Standard Error: 0.052194 0.054921 0.05198 0.054927 
l'-value: 0.0002 0.0002 0.737 0.4219 
Intermediat Coefficient estimate: -0.195096 -0.264565 0.16058 0.22379 
e Standard Error: 0.062138 0.066831 0.054278 0.057147 
p-value: 0.0017 0.0001 0.0032 0.0001 
Adjusted R squared: 0.237622 0.079655 0.233987 0.07601 
Durbin-Watson stat: 1.148825 0.981705 1.149846 0.985628 




I DeFacto Combined Inflation: 
Dependent Vanable: INFLA TIONRATES 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/17/02 Time: 14:28 
Sample(adjusted): 43 2815 
Included observations: 961 













S.E. of regreSSIon 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.001116 7.59E-05 14.69989 
0.021207 0.007408 2.86259 
0.087873 0.063994 1.373158 
0.012546 0.026882 0.467073 
-0.531647 0.335602 -1 .584159 
0.624628 0.15879 3.933871 
0.009892 0.051999 0.190235 
0.161034 0.053824 2.991888 
-0.029943 0.052699 -0.56628 
0.251782 Mean dependent var 
0.245495 S.D. dependent var 
0.657299 Akaike info criterion 
411.3043 Schwarz criterion 
-955.8279 F-statistic 
1.167558 Prob{F-statistic) 
I DeFacto Combined Growth: 
Dependent Vanable: GDPGROWTH 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/17/02 Tune: 14:32 
Sample(adjusted): 45 2719 
Inciuded observations: 816 

















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Stetistic 
-0.003193 0.002016 -1.584077 
-0.000172 0.001046 -0.164151 
-0.000927 0.001048 -0.866187 
0.078391 0.006661 11.76901 
0.072761 0.016976 4.285619 
-2.91E-06 1.21E-06 -2.406958 
0.008145 0.003215 2.533043 
-0.91485 0.068104 -13.43323 
0.000168 0.000109 1.544016 
0.000889 0.001094 0.813102 
-0.004317 0.002837 -1.521325 
0.002411 0.002832 0.851355 
0.016168 0.007295 2.216228 
0.322049 Mean dependent var 
0.311918 S.D. dependent var 
0.031477 Akaike info criterion 







































I DeJure Combined Inflation: 
Dependent Variable: INFLATIONRATES 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/17/02 Time: 14:30 
Sample(adjusted): 43 2815 
Inciuded observations: 961 













S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resld 
Log ~kelihood 
Durbin-Watson stet 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Stetistic 
0.001119 7.54E-05 14.84279 
0.025562 0.007524 3.397194 
0.103909 0.063461 1.637365 
0.015629 0.02637 0.592679 
-0.486348 0.335222 -1 .450825 
0.6B0868 0.159885 4.258482 
-0.180368 0.051768 -3.484164 
-0.230602 0.062117 -3.712357 
0.137564 0.057845 2.378144 
0.257381 Mean dependent var 
0.25114 S.D. dependent var 
0.654836 Akaike info criterion 
408.2267 Schwarz criterion 
-952.219 F-statistic 
1.172021 Prob(F-statlstlc) 
I Dejure Combined Growth: 
Dependent Variable: GDPGROWTH 
Method: Least Squeres 
Date: 03/17/02 Tune: 14:33 
Sample(adjusted): 45 2719 
Included observations: 816 

















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resld 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
-0.002976 0.002037 -1 .4606 
-4.48E-05 0.001051 -0.042687 
-0.000923 0.001048 -0.881024 
0.078211 0.00668 11.70849 
0.077073 0.017188 4.484188 
-2.95E-06 1.25E-06 -2.348566 
0.007862 0.003198 2.458629 
-0.908276 0.068222 -13.31351 
0.000137 0.000111 1.227408 
0.000788 0.001096 0.717741 
-0.001547 0.003419 -0.452337 
-0.000875 0.002844 -0.307715 
0.015708 0.007519 2.089018 
0.318478 Mean dependent var 
0.308293 S.D. dependent var 
0.031559 Akaike info criterion 







































Table 7 : 
Dependent Variable: GDPGROWTH 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04103102 TIme: 18:27 
Sample(adjusted): 45 2719 
Included observations: 809 
Volatllty L YS Growth 
Excluded observations: 1866 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IV 0.112575 0.02243 5.019036 
.1POP -0.87446 0.069604 -12.56328 
GDP70 -3.OSE.<J6 1.15E.<J6 -2.654881 
.1Gov(-l) -0.00132 0.001126 -1 .171848 
SEC -0.000141 0.00011 -1 .281829 
CML 0.00123 0.001028 1.196615 
ott 0.001037 0.00114 0.909595 
OPEN 0.005718 0.003175 1.801231 
aexrate -0.175429 0.057996 -3.024868 
aReserv9s -0.081495 0.016252 -5.014616 
C 0.020223 0.007188 2.813585 
R-squared 0.249444 Mean dependent var 
Adjusted R-squared 0.240039 S.D. dependent var 
S.E. of regression 0.032903 Akaike info criterion 
Sum squared resid 0.863941 Schwarz criterion 
Log likelihood 1619.688 F-statistic 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.423701 Prob(F-statistic) 
I Volatlllty Combined Growth: 
Dependent Variable: GDPGROWTH 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/03102 Time: 18:49 
Sample(adjusted): 45 2719 
Included observations: 809 

















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statlstic 
-0.00403 0.001974 -2.04179 
0.001025 0.001023 1.002738 
-0.001413 0.001042 -1 .355657 
0.07652 0.006549 11 .68513 
0.097638 0.021266 4.587021 
-2. 14E.<J6 1.19E.<J6 -1.793477 
0.005831 0.003079 1.894078 
-0.890491 0.065595 -13.57567 
5.78E-05 0.000105 0.550317 
0.000698 0.001056 0.660948 
-0.077281 0.054376 -1.421238 
-0.079242 0.015088 -5.252038 
0.019843 0.007761 2.556686 
0.361481 Mean dependent var 
0.351856 S.D. dependent var 
0.030387 Akaike info criterion 








































Dependllnt Variable: GDPGROWTH 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/03102 Time: 18:29 
Sample(adjusted): 452719 
Included observations: 871 
Volatility Ghosh Growth: 
Excluded observations: 1804 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IV 0.132553 0.020095 6.596267 0 
.1Gov(-l) -0.001028 0.001214 -0.846827 0.3973 
ott -O.OOO6BB 0.001113 -0.61825 0.5366 
DEVIND 0.00141 0.001138 1.23BB67 0.2157 
.1ext 0.075876 0.007322 10.36214 0 
aexrate -0.057097 0.061732 -0.924919 0.3553 
aReserves -0.041029 0.011795 -3.478545 0.0005 
C -0.016119 0.006518 -2.473142 0.0136 
R-squared 0.19197 Mean dependant var 0.020047 
Adjusted R-squared 0.185416 S.D. dependent var 0.039449 
S.E. of rllllression 0.035604 Akaike info cr~erion -3.823554 
Sum squared resid 1.094001 Schwarz criterion -3.779745 
Log likelihood 1673.158 F-statistic 29.28996 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.815418 Prob(F-statistic) 0 
Table 8: 
EXCHANGE_RATE_ VOLATILITY 































































































































I Volatility L YS Inflation: 
Dependent Variable: INFLATIONRATES 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04103102 Time: 18:37 
Sample(adjusted): 43 2815 IF TURNOVERAVAILABLE=1 
Included observations: 932 












S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 









0.912158 Mean dependent var 
0.911492 S.D. dependent var 
0.225739 Akaike info criterion 


















I Volatility Ghosh Inflation: 
Dependent Variable: INFLATION RATES 
Method: leastSq~s 
Date: 04/03102 Time: 18:36 
Sample(adjusted): 43 2815 
InclUded observations: 976 












S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 









0.120013 Mean dependent var 
0.11365 S.D. dependent var 
0.699138 Akaike info criterion 



















I Defacto L YS Growth: 
Dependent Variable: GDPGROWTH 
Melllod: least Squares 
Date: 04/01/02 Time: 15:00 
Sample(adjusted): 45 2719 
Included observations: 809 



















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Dulbin-Walson stat 
Coellicient Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.1062 0.022869 4.64376 
-0.880411 0.06991 -12.59342 
-3.21E-06 1.15E-06 -2.764062 
-0.001149 0.001148 -1 .00093 
-0.000106 0.000112 -0.95018 
0.000979 0.001042 0.939468 
0.000978 0.001148 0.851712 
0.006159 0.00329 1.871999 
0.001166 0.001529 0.762437 
-0.221794 0.082312 -2.694566 
-0.080317 0.016621 -4.63223 
-0.002512 0.003096 -0.811166 
0.001864 0.003126 0.596464 
0.0051 0.004755 1.072503 
0.021729 0.007316 2.97011 
0.252748 Mean dependent var 
0.23957 S.D. dependenl var 
0.032914 Akaike info criterion 
0.860141 Schwarz criterion 
1621.471 F-statistic 
1.43653 Prob(F-statIsIfc) 
I Defacto Ghosh Growth: 
Dependent Variable: GDPGROWTH 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/01/02 Time: 15:04 
Sample(adjusted): 45 2719 
Included observations: 871 
















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likenhood 
Durbin-Walson stat 
Coellicient Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.13022 0.020622 6.314451 
-0.001317 0.001238 -1 .063651 
-0.000337 0.001128 -0.298406 
0.000819 0.00121 0.678577 
0.077359 0.007431 10.4096 
-0.001488 0.001647 -0.00332 
-0.020883 0.086287 -0.236533 
-0.040401 0.011902 -3.394554 
-O.0012n 0.00314 -0.406625 
0.001813 0.003238 0.559848 
-0.006466 0.00445 -1 .45312 
-0.014267 0.008888 -2.071371 
0.195826 Mean dependent var 
0.185528 S.D. dependent var 
0.035602 Akaike info criterion 












































I Dejure L YS Growth: 
Dependent Variable: GDPGROWTH 
Melllod: least Squares 
Date: 04/01/02 Time: 15:01 
Sample(adjusted): 45 2719 
Included observetions: 809 


















S.E. of regression 
Sum square4 resid 
Log likenhood 
Durbin-Walson stat 
Coellicient Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.105224 0.023078 4.559433 
-0.881543 0.06994 -12.60422 
-3.40E-06 1.19E-06 -2.649732 
-0.001134 0.001147 -0.988326 
-0.000106 0.000114 -0.932889 
0.001048 0.001039 1.008395 
0.00105 0.001147 0.915564 
0.006217 0.003262 1.905921 
0.001104 0.001526 0.723537 
-0.212949 0.061997 -2.597036 
-0.064918 0.016928 -5.017103 
0.000636 0.003702 0.226529 
-0.002647 0.002987 -0.886157 
0.023345 O.oon45 3.01403 
0.251329 Mean dependent var 
0.239087 S.D. dependent var 
0.032924 Akaike info criterion 
0.861n2 Schwarz criterion 
1620.705 F-stalistic 
1.427n1 Prob(F-statistic) 
I Dejure Ghosh Growth: 
Dependent Variable: GDPGROWTH 
Melllod: Least Squares 
Date: 04/01102 Time: 15:04 
Sample(adjusted): 45 2719 
Included observations: 871 















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resld 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Walson stat 
Coelliclent Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.139744 0.020654 6.766065 
-0.001315 0.001237 -1 .083636 
-0.000485 0.001127 -0.430341 
0.000785 0.001254 0.6256 
0.On425 0.007428 10.42672 
-0.001538 0.001645 -0.934794 
-0.007127 0.087933 -0.08105 
-0.037176 0.012173 -3.053985 
-0.00218 0.003693 -0.590264 
0.003211 0.003029 1.05983 
-0.017657 0.007028 -2.512533 
0.195636 Mean dependent var 
0.186283 S.D. dependent var 
0.035585 Akalke info criterion 











































I Oefacto L YS Inflation: 
Dependent Variable: INFLATIONRATES 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04101/02 TIme: 15:08 
Sample(adjusted): 1 2815 
Included obseNations: 1623 















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.002035 6.63E-05 30.8968 
0.006637 0.003031 2.189673 
-0.024028 0.010646 -2.256924 
-0.002046 0.017483 -0.11703 
-0.753524 0.173751 -4.336805 
0.611634 0.056563 10.B0944 
-0.010963 0.014003 -0.762659 
-0.032372 0.033963 -0.952615 
0.110642 0.03742 2.956747 
-0.034436 0.037386 -0.921087 
0.115557 0.027383 4.219998 
0.434409 Mean dependent var 
0.4309 S.D. dependent var 
0.500647 Akaike info criterion 
404.0429 Schwarz criterion 
-1174.536 F-statistic 
0.66207 Prob(F-statistic) 
I Dafaeto Ghosh Inflation: 
Dependent Variable: INFLATIONRATES 
Method: Least Squares ~ 
Date: 04/01/02 Tune: 15:11 
Sample(adjusted): 43 2815 
Included obseNations; 976 















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefllclent Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.035081 0.007887 4.447796 
0.07822 0.088655 1.139326 
0.015637 0.026485 0.548955 
-0.516736 0.354572 -1.45735 
0.907302 0.168879 5.372499 
0.819113 0.079137 7.823301 
0.057783 0.115659 0.499601 
0.041699 0.061095 0.682522 
0.169062 0.062263 2.715273 
-0.00232 0.068771 -0.033739 
-0.10767 0.063276 -1 .701568 
0.128168 Mean dependent var 
0.119134 S.D. dependent var 
0.696972 Akaike info criterion 







































I DeJure L YS Inflation: 
Dependent Variable: INFLATIONRATES 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04/01102 TIme: 15:09 
Sarnple(adjusted): 1 2815 
Included obseNations: 1623 
Excluded obseNations: 1192 aIIer adjusting endpoints 












Adjusted R-squared 0.429 
S.E. of regression 0.501482 
Sum squared resid 405.6436 
Log likelihood -1177.747 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.676585 
I Dejure Ghosh inflation: 
Dependent Variable: INFLA TIONRA TES 
Methocl: Least Squares 
Date: 04101/02 TIme: 15:12 
Sample(adjusted): 43 2815 
Included obseNations: 976 











Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 




Variable Coefllcient Std. Error t-Statistlc 
AM2 0.039108 0.007922 4.936264 
Alnt 0.087905 0.067907 1.294496 
OPE", 0.023729 0.027799 0.853607 
Ay -0.450916 0.353153 -1 .276829 
Tum 0.956617 0.169424 5.646302 
aexrate 0.638243 0.078268 8.152486 
aReseNes 0.097588 0.115476 0.645081 
DEJUREFIX -0.219324 0.054721 -4.00801 
DEJUREINTER -0.266145 0.066039 -4.03009 
C 0.094696 0.06263 1.512002 
R-squared 0.136856 Mean dependent var 
Adjusted R-squared 0.130633 S.D. dependent var 
S.E. of regression 0.692326 Akaike info criterion 
Sum squared resid 463.021 Schwarz criterion 
Log likelihood -1020.967 F-statistic 




































I Oefiicto Combined Inflation: 
Dependent Variable: INFLATION RATES 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04101102 Time: 15:17 
Sample(adjusted): 43 2815 
Included observations: 933 
















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resld 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefticient Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.006585 7.22E~5 91 .17116 
0.005768 0.002565 2.248481 
0.056811 0.02228 2.54986 
0.012893 0.009222 1.398008 
0.067058 0.117375 0.5713 
0.122528 0.055613 2.203242 
0.501153 0.025547 19.61685 
0.103629 0.090173 1.14922 
~.007313 0.020244 ~.361258 
0.041426 0.02042 2.028702 
~.003958 0.0227 ~.174346 
~.01692 0.022224 ~.761354 
0.913314 Mean dependent var 
0.912279 S.D. dependent var 
0.224822 Akaike info criterion 
48.48689 Sctr.YaIz ailerion 
75.45407 F-slatistiC 
1.964692 Prob(F-statistic) 
I Ollfacto Combined Growth: 
Dependent Variable: GDPGROWTH 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04101102 Time: 15:19 
Sample{adjusted): 45 2719 
InckJded observations: 809 




















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
~.004004 0.001982 -2.01943 
0.000872 0.001031 0.845017 
~.001425 0.001045 -1 .363646 
0.078383 0.006556 11.85131 
0.093038 0.021586 4.310181 
-2.26E~ 1.20E~ -1.886488 
0.006081 0.003179 1.912725 
~.895284 0.065864 -13.59295 
8.13E~5 0.000106 0.765385 
0.000733 0.001062 0.690114 
~.085251 0.055385 -1.53923 
~.077864 0.015361 -5.066852 
~.002479 0.002855 ~.868498 
0.002114 0.002666 0.732477 
0.002822 0.004402 0.641214 
0.020534 0.007823 2.624703 
0.363503 Mean dependent var 
0.351463 S.D. dependent var 
0.030396 Akaika info ailerion 













































I OeJure Combined Inflation: 
Dependent Varia~e: INFLATION RATES 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04101102 Time: 15:18 
Sample(adjusted): 43 2815 
Included observations: 933 















S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resld 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
CoeIIicient Std. Error t-Statistic 
0.006571 7.24E~ 90.73299 
0.006739 0.002591 2.600745 
0.061373 0.022121 2.774372 
0.013525 0.009066 1.491746 
0.08086 0.117271 0.689515 
0.136267 0.056025 2.432242 
0.507434 0.025399 19.9783 
0.123987 0.091508 1.354932 
~.05397 0.018395 -2.933994 
~.052878 0.021734 -2.432923 
0.023755 0.022093 1.075212 
0.913594 Mean dependent var 
0.912656 S.D. dependent var 
0.224137 Akaike info ailerion 
48.31901 Schwarz criterion 
76.96116 F-statistiC 
1.968085 Prob{F-statistic) 
I DeJure Combined Growth: 
Dependent Veriable: GDPGROWTH 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 04101102 Time: 15:20 
Sample(adjusted): 452719 
Included observations: 809 



















S.E. of regreSSion 
Sum squared resid 
Log Ukelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
~.003821 0.001991 -1.918794 
0.000952 0.001027 0.927312 
~.001401 0.001043 -1.343116 
0.076453 0.006559 11.8559 
0.093204 0.02192 4251998 
-2.34E~6 1.24E~ -1.882206 
0.005789 0.003149 1.8384 
~.89381 0.065786 -13.58655 
7.82E~5 0.000108 0.725927 
0.000701 0.00106 0.660945 
~.072329 0.055399 -1.305601 
~.08262 0.01563 -5.285937 
0.001716 0.003421 0.501546 
~.000969 0.00277 ~.349983 
0.020341 0.008088 2.515033 
0.362089 Mean dependent var 
0.350841 S.D. dependent var 
0.03041 Akaike info criterion 
0.73428 Schwarz ailerion 
1885.465 F-statistiC 
1.595267 Prob(F-statistiC) 
Prob. 
0 
0.0095 
0.0056 
0.1361 
0.4907 
0.0152 
0 
0.1758 
0.0034 
0.0152 
0.2826 
0.204896 
0.7584 
~.1414 
~.08435 
974.8498 
0 
Prob. 
0.0554 
0.354 
0.1796 
0 
0 
0.0602 
0.0664 
0 
0.4681 
0.5088 
0.1921 
0 
0.6161 
0.7264 
0.0121 
0.021511 
0.037744 
-4.1297 
-4.04264 
32.19195 
0 
